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ABSTRACT 
 
DO INFLATION TARGETING REGIMES REDUCE INFLATION UNCERTAINTY? 
EVIDENCE FROM FIVE INDUSTRIALIZED AND FIVE EMERGING COUNTRIES 
 
Ertürk, Burak 
 
Master of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ümit Özlale 
 
February, 2004 
 
 
In this thesis, using a time-varying parameter model with GARCH specification, it was 
investigated whether there is a structural break in expected inflation and two types of inflation 
uncertainties –structural and impulse uncertainty- for five industrialized and five emerging 
countries after the implementation of inflation targeting. Many industrialized and emerging 
countries attempted to stabilize their price levels with the help of a monetary discipline 
satisfied by the features of inflation targeting. These regimes are thought to lower the 
uncertainties regarding inflation dynamics. This methodology allows decomposing two types 
of uncertainties and it was claimed that successful implementation of inflation targeting 
removes these uncertainties. Two types of tests were employed to detect this claim: A simple 
non-parametric test which examine whether the changes in the mean and the variance of 
expected inflation along with two types of inflation uncertainty are statistically significant; 
and a parametric test whether there has been a shift in mean or a shift in the trend for expected 
inflation and two types of uncertainties.      
Both non-parametric and parametric test results indicate that the inflation targeting 
regimes are particularly successful in reducing expected inflation while there is less evidence 
that implementation of inflation targeting reduce inflation uncertainty.  
 
 
Keywords: Inflation Targeting, Expected Inflation, Inflation Uncertainty, Time Varying 
Parameter Models 
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ÖZET 
 
ENFLASYON HEDEFLEMES REJM ENFLASYON BELRSZLN AZALTIR MI? BE 
SANAYLEM VE BE GELEN ÜLKEDEN KANIT 
 
Ertürk, Burak 
 
Yüksek Lisans, ktisat Bölümü 
 
Tez Danımanı:Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ümit Özlale 
 
ubat, 2004 
 
Bu tezde, zaman içinde deien parametre modeli ve GARCH çerçevesinde, be 
sanayilemi ve be gelien ülke ekonomisinin, enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimine geçtikten 
sonra, enflasyon beklentilerinde ve çeitli enflasyon belirsizliklerinde yapısal bir deiim 
yaanıp yaanmadıı incelenmitir. Bir çok ülke, enflasyon hedeflemesi rejiminin getirdii 
parasal disiplinin yardımıyla fiyat seviyesini sabitlemeye çalımıtır. Enflasyon hedeflemesi 
rejiminin enflasyon dinamiklerinden doan belirsizlikleri azalttıı düünülmektedir. Bu 
sunulan yöntem iki çeit enflasyon belirsizliini ayrıtırmakta ve enflasyon hedeflemesinin bu 
belirsizlikleri azalttıını iddia etmektedir. Bu iddiayı aratırmak üzere iki çeit test 
uygulanmıtır. Parametrik olmayan test yardımı ile beklenen enflasyonun ve enflasyon 
belirsizliklerinin varyansında ve ortalamasında olan deiimler; parametrik test yardımı ile de 
bu serilerin ortalama deerleri ve eilimlerinde yapısal bir kırılma olup olmadıı 
aratırılmıtır.  
Parametrik ve parametrik olmayan testlerin sonuçlarına gore, enflasyon 
hedeflemesinin beklenen enflasyonu düürdüü kesin olarak söylenmesine ramen, enflasyon 
belirsizliini düsürdüüne ilikin yeterli kanıt bulunamamıtır.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Enflasyon Hedeflemesi, Enflasyon Beklentisi, Enflasyon Belirsizlii, 
Zaman çinde Deien Parametre Modeli 
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1 Introduction
In the beginning of 1990’s, some of the developed and developing countries pi-
oneered inflation targeting which is a strategy for conducting monetary policy.
These countries have understood the benefits of the price stability and intro-
duced this strategy. Therefore, it is common to find that price stability as the
primary goal of many central banks’ monetary policy.
Inflation targeting is a framework where a specified inflation objective is
tasked to achieve by the central bank. The main characteristic of this strategy
is the public announcement of the inflation targets or target bands over a time
range and the main goal of it is the low and stable inflation in the long run.
The central bank’s policy actions will then be targeting the deviations between
the actual inflation and the specified inflation rate and strengthen the central
bank’s accountability.
Apart from low inflation, macroeconomic policy includes many goals, such
as low unemployment, high real growth, and financial stability. Direct inflation
targeting is considered as a statement that none of the intermediate monetary-
aggregate targeting, exchange-rate targeting and the aggregate-demand man-
agement targeting policies can give a satisfactory framework for monetary policy.
Inflation targeting, and therefore price stability is a signaling mechanism of free
market economies to direct resources eﬃciently to their most productive stage.
In a situation where price volatility is reduced, it will be less price alternations
and it is likely to have a general economic and financial stability. Implementing
price stability as the primary goal improves transparency, accountability, and
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credibility to monetary policy.
The primary goal of inflation targeting which is the price stability in the
long run can be seen as the ignorance of the other policy objectives, although it
is not. Stabilizing the prices as the principal objective and communicating the
policy goals to the public depends on three concepts.
First, the macroeconomists are not sure about the eﬃciency of the monetary
policy in the usage of short-run fluctuations. Most of policy-makers believe in
that monetary policy can only aﬀect the inflation rate in the long run. Low
inflation target is the primary goal due to that reason, not because of the unim-
portance of unemployment or other problems.
Second, even reasonable inflation rates are risky for the eﬃciency and growth
of the economy so low and stable rate of inflation is crucial for other macroeco-
nomic goals.
Third, the long run goal of monetary policy as the price stability provides a
key part in the overall framework. Policy-makers use that framework and inform
public about their objective. Also, they force the central bank and government
to improve their accountability and discipline. In the terminology of monetary
economics, an inflation target serves as a nominal anchor for monetary policy.
This regime has some benefits and costs. Inflation targeting can improve
the relation between the monetary policy and other policies, depending on the
way the target is defined and the target is not contradictory with other policy
intentions. The inflation targets should be set jointly by government, the central
bank and discussion should be done with all public, private sector, and trade
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unions. The coordination between the central bank and government should
guarantee the functioning of inflation targeting and the instrumental indepen-
dence of central bank.
The announcement of inflation targeting make explicit the purpose of the
central bank, thus makes the forecast more transparent, and reduces the un-
certainty about the future path of monetary policy. Inflation targeting also
improves the disciple on the monetary policy and increase the accountability of
central bank.
Also, there are some disadvantages which are a complicated methodology
to implement. Inflation targeting relies on forecasting. It can be the fragility
because the prediction method is not reliable, so inflation forecasts become un-
certain. Moreover, there is risk that inflation targeting could result in ineﬃcient
output stabilization because of a considerable supply shock like the increase of
oil prices.
Before passing the inflation targeting regime, there are some preconditions
that have to be provided. The freedom of the central bank is the most important
precondition to achieve financial stability. The government and central bank
jointly decide on the targets, however central bank should use any instrument
freely to success the eventual goal of financial stability. Also Central Bank has
to communicate with the public about its policy and objective.
Furthermore, there has to be a well developed financial market in the country
to achieve the objectives of this strategy. The policy instruments that will be
used by the monetary authorities to target inflation and keep it within that limit
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will require eﬀective money, capital and foreign exchange markets. If financial
markets do not respond quickly to the instruments employed, it reduces the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy and result in a delay in aﬀecting the inflation.
In addition to these conditions, the inflation target will not subordinate
to other objectives. Fiscal policies should not dominate monetary policies, the
external position have to be strong to allow monetary policy to practice inflation
targeting as its primary objective, and inflation have to be low at the beginning
of inflation targeting to provide satisfactory monetary control.
Also, to achieve the credibility for inflation targeting regime, and to assure
political support, initial successes in achieving inflation targets are important.
It is interesting that inflation targeting is generally adopted at times when the
inflation is low and falling, instead of times when inflation is rising or out of
control.
The final set of condition is the need for proper resources to adopt monetary
policy for the health of inflation targets. A central bank has to aﬀect behavior
of inflation by using its policy instruments and it has to understand the relation
between the inflation and the eﬀects of the policies, exchange rate goals have
to be directed according to the inflation target, and public debt control and
fiscal policy framework have to be in coordination with the inflation target.
Moreover, central banks have necessary infrastructure such as well-educated
human resources, technological equipment, and sophisticated prediction models.
There are lots of design and implementation issues for the adoption of infla-
tion targeting regime. Two important concepts for the inflation targeting are
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the flexibility and transparency. Transparency means clearly and timely com-
munication of policy goals, targets and methods to the public. The objectives
of the transparency are to improve the understanding of the public about the
capabilities of the monetary policy, to reduce the financial and economic un-
certainty, and to enhance the accountability of the monetary authorities. On
the other hand, flexibility means the capability of the central bank to respond
eﬃciently to short-run fluctuations under the limitations of inflation targeting
regime. In the construction of the inflation targeting framework, the important
concept is the balancing of the flexibility and transparency.
If we look at the key operational issues that are arose in the implementation
of inflation targeting; these issues include the definition of the target, numerical
targets; the time range, the condition that causes the modification of the target.
The design of the inflation targeting regime starts with decision on the price
index that will be targeted. For the highest transparency, the price index has
to be well-known, precise, broad-base and timely. For the highest flexibility,
the prices changes in narrowly defined sectors and one-time jumps have to be
excluded in the calculation of the index.
The central banks of all inflation targeting countries have measured the rate
of inflation by using some version of the consumer price index. This index
excludes the volatile elements due to focusing on core inflation. However, the
central bank has to explain the reason of its choice to the public. The central
bank has to prove that the chosen index does not guarantee the approving results
among the other price indexes. Hence, the chosen index should be consistent
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during the inflation targeting regime. If the data is collected by an institution
that is independent of the monetary authority, the public can be ensured about
the reliability of the central bank.
To choose the numerical value for the inflation target rate, central banks gen-
erally emphasize price stability as their goal. The concept of the price stability
oﬀers a rate very near to zero. Targeting the rate at zero could lead to some
significant problems. These conditions suggest that inflation targets should be
set above zero, around 1 to 3 percent per annum. This has been the decision
of most of the inflation targeting central banks. Inflation targeting provides a
border from above and below for the inflation rate. The good working inflation
targeting regime should protect the economy from the deflationary forces, the
risk of too little inflation and the cost of very high inflation.
Moreover, there is a discussion about the usage of price-level target and in-
flation target. The disadvantage of targeting the inflation rate is the unexpected
shocks to the price level may be never compensated. It can lead to the large
variance of the long-term estimates of the price level and hinder the plans of the
private sector. Alternatively, strict price level says that overshoots and under-
shoots of the inflation target be fully structured. This decreases the variance
of long-run estimates of the price level. In reality, central banks prefer inflation
rather than price level targets.
Inflation targets can be defined for one or more horizons. Inflation is not
controllable for short horizons and is not credible for long periods. Therefore
the targets, shorter than 1 year and longer than 4 years are not compatible.
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Inside the borders of 1 to 4 year band, the target choice of the central bank
aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between the flexibility and the transparency.
In addition to the choices of the horizon and the numerical values, the central
bank has to decide on the announcement of the targets whether it is a single
point or a range around some mid point. The advantage of the range is that
the targeting regime is more flexible. However, the use of range system has
some costs. In this system, monetary and political authorities are generally
interested in whether inflation is inside or outside the targeted band. They
do not focus on the deviation from the midpoint of the range. Also, if the
central bank chooses a narrower range, it is more promising for the central bank
to approach its inflation goal and it decreases the ability of the central bank to
react unexpected events. Due to that reason, inflation can move out of its range.
Missing the target can lead to greater loss of credibility than missing the target
point. One solution to these problems is to increase the target range. It reduces
the instability and control problems; however, it can cause loss of credibility.
Widening targets might be seen as the weakening of the determination of the
monetary institutions, although they are trying to strengthen the abilities of the
system. The alternative of the target range is the point target. For the success
of point target strategy, the explanation of the central bank has to be convincing
because holding the inflation inside a narrow band is not achievable for even the
best policies. This is a though challenge; however, as long as explanations of
the central bank is reliable for the public, the bank increases its credibility and
has greater flexibility to handle the target deviations.
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The targets are sometimes being missed; the decisions of the monetary au-
thorities lead to these misses. Because inflation targeting is a constrained dis-
cretion, some disturbances about macroeconomics variable other than inflation
targeting can give good explanation for the missed or changes targets. Accord-
ing to the type of the hitting shock, the targets can be changed. For instance,
an a sharp increase in the oil prices might result in a disagreement between sta-
bilizing output and employment in the short run, and stabilizing the inflation
in the long run. However, a great supply shock generally can be an excuse for
the missing or changing the target. On the other hand, missing the target does
not show that the inflation targeting strategy is failed. If the central bank is
able to explain the reasons of this deviation to the public, the credibility of it
will not decrease.
Moreover, there are some communication issues. As it is seen, one of the
benefits of the inflation targeting is that it improves the transparency and ac-
countability of monetary policy. To achieve that benefit, there are some issues
that have to be clarified such as what the information does the central bank
communicate to the public? To improve the credibility of the central bank
for the public, the central bank should announce regular information about
the economic conditions, the monetary policy of the bank, and the intentions
of the policy. That has been the method of most inflation targeting central
banks. Particularly, the central bank should inform the public about the under-
lying principals that base the chosen inflation targets and strategy; the current
stance for the economy; and reports and analyses of inflation indicators that
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include private sector estimates and the central bank’s own estimates. Also, it
should provide information about whether the targets are achieved or not by
explaining why a target might have been changed or missed. The credibility
of the central bank is related with the matching of the announcements and the
hitting targets. In addition to them, central bank is responsible for the educa-
tion of the public about the abilities of the monetary policy. It increases the
policy makers’ accountability and leads to a better economic result. Most of the
central banks publish regular inflation reports, or any other documents which
explains the economic conditions and the monetary policy. These documents
improve the understanding of the public and acceptance of the bank’s monetary
policies.
There are some important messages to be got from the countries which
have introduced inflation targeting. A number of countries like Canada, New
Zealand, Sweden, and South Africa have successfully implemented the single
policy goal of price stability. Evidences show that these experiences are success-
ful. Those countries implementing a price stability goal have enhanced their
inflation performance. Particularly, they have all significantly decreased their
rates of inflation since implementing inflation targeting. Most of these countries
improved their inflation purpose ahead of schedule. Groundwork studies show
that they are more successful than the other countries in a number of other
criteria as well as in lowering the inflation.
Another lesson is that setting up the credibility of inflation targeting is not
easy and takes place over an extended time period. The simple announcement of
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targets does not by itself provide credibility to inflation targets. After the price
stability is recorded and intuitional arrangements are constructed, credibility
develops as a consequence.
It is clearly seen that all central banks that have adopted inflation targeting
have reported their monetary policy more open and transparent. These banks
understood that, for the success of their policy, the objectives should be trans-
parent, simple, understandable, and validated. Monthly or quarterly reports of
inflation are announced by most of them.
Practices showed that when rates of inflation are low or decreasing, inflation
targeting is more successful. Some of the developing markets with high inflation
rates met particular problems in the application of inflation targeting. In the
case of high inflation countries, the future prediction about the inflation rates
becomes less accurate. Therefore, setting targets under such conditions could
cause the decrease in the credibility of central banks. On the other hand, when
the rate of inflation is low, the estimation accuracy becomes higher.
To sum up, the eventual success of inflation targeting needs a common agree-
ment of the trade unions, monetary authorities and private sector to decide on
the conditions of reducing inflation or maintaining the low inflation. If this ap-
proach is not helpful, then achieving this approach will be diﬃcult. It also makes
the central bank more accountable and this decreases the political pressure to
follow inflationary policy.
Although inflation targeting regimes are viewed to be successful, there are
also some critical studies, which state that achieving price stability is indepen-
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dent of inflation targeting. For example, Cecchetti and Ehrman (1999) argue
that over the last decade, aversion to inflation variability increased in all major
economies irrespective of whether they are operating under inflation targeting
or not. They argue that the main reason for this aversion is the significant
costs induced by distorting allocation decisions of individuals and firms. Also,
Bernanke et al (1999) discuss that inflation targeting is not new and add that
Germany and Switzerland have employed a kind of hybrid inflation targeting for
a long period of time. Also, it is often reported that the United States economy
has a monetary framework that is very close to the spirit of inflation targeting.
Finally, Johnson (2002) states that although there is a decrease in the level of
expected inflation after the implementation of inflation targeting, there is not
a change in inflation variability. He also finds that ‘inflation targeting’ coun-
tries do not significantly diﬀer -in terms of inflation performance- from other
economies which have not adopted such regimes.
In this study, we take the above discussion as our starting point and test
whether there has been a structural break in expected inflation and inflation
uncertainty after the implementation of inflation targeting. Our sample con-
sists of five industrialized countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden
and United Kingdom, which have adopted the inflation targeting regimes for
suﬃciently long periods of time. First, we employ a time-varying parameter
framework with GARCH specification, which allows us to derive two distinct
types of inflation uncertainties, -structural uncertainty and impulse uncertainty-
along with expected inflation. Therefore, instead of employing the survey-based
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inflation forecasts and expectations, which can be biased as Bomberger (1996)
suggests, we derive both the expected inflation and the uncertainty series from a
dynamic time-series model. Then, we use both non-parametric and parametric
tests to detect any possible structural break in these three derived series.
Our non-parametric tests suggest that the mean and the variance of expected
inflation are significantly lower after the implementation of inflation targeting
(the only exception is Sweden, where variance of expected inflation is higher
after the adoption of inflation targeting). They also imply that both structural
uncertainty and impulse uncertainty sharply decrease for New Zealand, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
When the structural break test proposed by Banerjee et al (1992) is applied,
we find a break in the mean for expected inflation for all of the countries after
the adoption of inflation targeting. However, the results are less promising for
the two inflation uncertainty series after the implementation of the regime.
As a result, our findings support the views put forth by Johnson (2002),
which state that while inflation targeting is successful in changing inflation ex-
pectations, it is less successful in reducing uncertainty that stems from the
inflation process.
The next section briefly discusses the relationship between inflation targeting
regimes, expected inflation and inflation uncertainty. Then, we will introduce
our baseline model in which expected inflation and inflation uncertainties are
derived. In the fourth section, after the results are displayed, the structural
break tests are applied along with an interpretation. The final section concludes.
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2 Inflation Targeting and Uncertainty
Within the last decade, a dense amount of studies in central banking have been
devoted to the search for a nominal anchor. In this context, ‘inflation targeting’
has emerged as the appropriate framework, in which ‘increased communication’
and ‘accountability’, the two main characteristics of the regime, are viewed to
eliminate any type of uncertainties about price stability. However, as mentioned
above, Johnson (2002)’s findings cast some doubt about the positive impact of
inflation targeting framework on inflation variability1. Also, several studies,
including Bernanke et al (1999) and Groenveld (1998) show that the imple-
mentation of inflation targeting does not exhibit any change in actual inflation
process.
Another critical issue that is often discussed in the literature is the flexibility
of the inflation targeting regime and its impact on macroeconomic uncertainty.
While some studies such as Clarida et al (2000) argue that monetary authorities
should accommodate supply shocks as long as the long-run price stability objec-
tive has not been distorted, Dittmar et al (1999) strictly prefer a ’strict inflation
targeting’ policy and state that setting multiple objectives increase uncertainty
about inflation and future price levels. They conclude that if inflation-targeting
regimes achieve price stability and reduce uncertainty, this success will be due
to less weight attached to output stability. Gavin (2003), on the other hand,
argues that the reason behind the success of inflation targeting is the extra
information that central banks provide to concentrate expectations on a com-
1See Bernanke and Woodford (2003) for a recent detailed discussion on inflation targeting.
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mon trend. Such information will reduce uncertainty about long run inflation,
eliminate any confusion about the stance of monetary policy and decrease the
likelihood of any forms of instability.
The above discussion also implies a policy proposal for other countries that
have not followed explicit inflation targeting. For example, Gurkaynak et al
(2003) discuss that the United States economy could benefit more if the Federal
Reserve becomes more explicit about long-run inflation objectives since United
States interest rates react excessively to macro data releases and news about
monetary policy.
14
3 Measuring Inflation Uncertainty
There are two commonly used procedures to measure inflation uncertainty in
the literature. The first one is the survey-based approach as employed by Hafer
(1986) and Davis and Kanogo (1996). Recently, close to these two studies,
Johnson (2002) used two measures, standard deviation of expected inflation
and average absolute size of inflation forecast errors in his study. However, as
Bomberger (1996) noted, using the dispersion of the survey forecast does not
fully provide a measure of uncertainty, rather it provides a measure of disagree-
ment. Also, it may be the case that forecasters may try to avoid deviating from
others’ forecasts, which may cause a bias.
The second approach is to employ a class of Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroscedastic (ARCH) models, as in Grier and Perry (1998) and Kontonikas
(2002). Such a methodology adequately captures inflation uncertainty by using
the conditional variance of the residuals of inflation specification. However, such
models fail to account for the structural changes in the inflation process, which
also provides another major source of uncertainty. A time-varying parameter
framework, which relaxes the assumption that the regressors have the same im-
pact on the inflation process during the sample period, seems to fit this purpose.
In this context, the randomness in the time-varying estimates has the poten-
tial to reflect the uncertainty inherent in the structure of the inflation process.
Also, if there is a change in the expectations due to the course of the monetary
policy (which is to be expected at the beginning stage of an inflation targeting
regime), it will again be observed in time-varying parameter estimates. As a
15
result, time-varying parameter models and the Kalman Filter, which emerges
as the only estimation method, are capable of measuring inflation uncertainty
by estimating the time-varying conditional variance of a variable’s parameter
estimates.
3.1 The Model
In this study, we combine two of the above-mentioned methodologies and follow
a time-varying parameter model with GARCH specification. Such a methodol-
ogy was first introduced by Evans (1991). By employing such a model, we do
not only improve over standard ARCH models, but we also derive two distinct
types of inflation uncertainties: one emerging from the conditional variance of
the residuals of inflation specification and the other representing the randomness
of the structure of the inflation process. Formally, the model can be written as:
πt+1 = Xtβt+1 + εt+1, where εt+1 ∼ N(0, ht) (1)
βt+1 = βt + vt+1, where vt+1 ∼ N(0,Q) (2)
ht = h+
mX
i=0
φiε2t−i +
nX
i=1
γiht−i (3)
In the model above, πt denotes the inflation rate and Xt is the regressor
matrix, which consists of the constant term, the lagged variables of the inflation
rate and a dummy variable which takes the value of one after the country has
adopted inflation targeting regime.
In the first equation, εt is normally distributed with a time varying con-
ditional variance of ht, which indicates the changes in uncertainty about the
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future inflation at time t. The third equation presents the conditional variance
of the inflation residuals and implies that if past forecasts deviate substantially
from the real rate, uncertainty will increase.
The second equation, on the other hand, represents the evolution of time
varying parameters, which are asssumed to follow a random walk. As explained
in Evans (1991), such an assumption can be defended on theoretical grounds:
If the structural variations in the economy are due to changing views about the
structure of the economy, then it would be almost impossible to predict any
future changes in policy and movements in time-varying betas, which would
justify the choice of a random walk assumption. Again in the second equa-
tion, vt+1 is the vector of shocks to βt+1, and it is normally distributed with a
homoscedastic covariance matrix of Q.
After presenting the inflation equation, the next step is to include the Kalman
Filter updating equations. In such a setting, Kalman Filter enters into process
for two reasons. First, in a time-varying parameter framework, Kalman Filter
emerges as the only estimation methodology. Second, and more importantly, the
updating equations regarding Kalman Filter enable us to decompose diﬀerent
types of inflation uncertainties. The updating equations are:
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πt+1 = XtEtβt+1 + ηt+1 (4)
Ht = XtΩt+1|tXTt + ht (5)
Et+1βt+2 = Etβt+1 +
£
Ωt+1|tXTt H−1t
¤
ηt+1 (6)
Ωt+2|t+1 =
£
I − Ωt+1|tXTt H−1t Xt
¤
Ωt+1|t +Q (7)
The conditional covariance matrix of βt+1, which represents the structural
uncertainty of the inflation process, is denoted by Ωt+1|t. Then, equation (5)
shows that two types of uncertainties, -which originate from shocks to inflation
process (εt+1) and from the structure of inflation (vt+1)− can be decomposed
and estimated. On the other hand, the sixth equation shows how the estimates of
time-varying betas are updated with respect to the past forecast errors. Finally,
both equations (6) and (7) show how the new information about the inflation
process is reflected in the conditional distribution of βt+1.
The above discussion implies that it is possible to derive two diﬀerent types
of inflation uncertainties. First, ε can be thought as shocks that hit the economy.
Then, the time-varying parameters will show how these shocks are propogated
through the economy. Such a terminology is consistent with Frisch and Slut-
sky’s distinction between impulses and propagation2. Then, the uncertainty
stemming from the randomness in β gives a measure of structural uncertainty,
which is measured byXtΩt+1|tXTt . On the other hand, the uncertainty that orig-
inates from the randomness in ε can be named as impulse uncertainty, which is
2See Blanchard and Fischer (1989), page 277.
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measured by ht3 .
It is important to further discuss the two types of inflation uncertainties.
Inflation uncertainty aﬀects both the intertemporal and intratemporal decisions
of individuals and firms. In this context, structural uncertainty can be viewed
as being more dominant on the intertemporal decision making process for the
agents in the economy while impulse uncertainty mostly aﬀects the temporal
decisions. Such a distinction has also important policy implications from the
view of monetary policy. If the impulse uncertainty stems from the shocks that
are viewed as mostly temporary, then the Central Banks might not have strong
incentives to change the course of monetary policy. However, if the uncertainty
originates from a randomness in the structure of inflation process, which may
also aﬀect the long-run level of inflation, then Central Banks have good reasons
to account for this factor in the policymaking process.
3.2 Justification of the Model
As noted above, we assume an autoregressive process for the inflation equation
along with a constant term and dummy variable representing the period under
inflation targeting. For each country, the length of the lags are chosen with
respect to both Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria.
On the other hand, ARCH-LM tests are employed to test the presence of
an ARCH eﬀect. It is found that an ARCH specification is appropriate for all
the countries examined. After various specifications of GARCH are considered,
GARCH (1,1) is selected as the process to assess the conditional variance.
3We are grateful to Peter N. Ireland for his suggestions on this issue.
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3.2.1 Data
The sample consists of five industrialized countries, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, United Kingdom and Sweden, which have adopted inflation targeting
early in the 1990’s. These countries along with Finland are known to be the ear-
liest inflation targeters. Table 1 shows the adoption dates of inflation targeting
and the full sample period used in this study.
Table 1: Data Sample
Country Date Adopted Sample Period
Australia April 1993 1980-2003, Quarterly
Canada February 1991 1980-2003, Monthly
New Zealand March 1990 1980-2003, Quarterly
Sweden January 1993 1980-2003, Monthly
United Kingdom October 1992 1980-2003, Monthly
For all of the cases, seasonally ajusted CPI inflation has been used. Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test shows that inflation rate is stationary in all of the
cases examined. Although most of the countries in the sample announce CPI
inflation as the target variable, such a choice can also be criticized since CPI is
sensitive to energy prices and seasonal factors such as food prices. However, the
main goal of this study is to examine whether the expected inflation and infla-
tion uncertainty have reduced after the implementation of inflation targeting.
Since CPI is the most commonly observed price index, which is closely associ-
ated with the expectations in the economy, we believe that using CPI inflation
does not cause a flaw in the analysis.
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4 Results and Structural Break Tests
In this section after the regression results are presented for each country, the ex-
pected inflation series are displayed along with actual inflation. Next, a simple
non-parametric test is employed to detect whether the diﬀerences in the mean
and the variance for expected inflation and the two types of inflation uncertainty
are statistically significant after the countries in our sample have adopted infla-
tion targeting. Finally, by using the structural break test proposed by Banerjee
et al (1992), we test whether the shift to the inflation targeting regime has
caused either a shift in trend or a break in mean for inflation uncertainties and
expected inflation.
4.1 Regression Results
Table 2 presents the t-statistics for the dummy variable that denotes the inflation
targeting period, and the lag length of the regressor matrix where SIC and AIC
take the minimum values.
Table 2: Regression Results
Country t− Stat (Dummy for I.T.) Lag Length
Australia 4.73 3
Canada 29.43 5
New Zealand 7.53 3
Sweden 19.64 1
United Kingdom 33.5 1
As it can be seen in Table 2, the t-statistics regarding the dummy variable
that represents the inflation targeting period is very high. Such a result implies
that implementing inflation targeting has been an important factor in explaining
the inflation dynamics for all of the countries. Also, the graphs for time-varying
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expected inflation and the two types of inflation uncertainties are displayed in
Figures 1-5, at the end of the text. One common feature of the figures is that
although impulse uncertainty takes on slightly lower values, the two types of
uncertainties tend to comove together. Also, the figures imply that the expected
inflation and the actual inflation do not diverge significantly from each other for
most of the periods.
4.2 Non-Parametric Tests
In this section, a simple non-parametric test will be applied to test whether the
changes in the mean and the variance of expected inflation along with two types
of inflation uncertainty are statistically significant. Under the null hypothesis,
there is no diﬀerence in mean or variance between two sub-periods. Table 3
through 6 present the test results regarding the three variables.
Table 3: Non-Parametric Test Results For The Mean Of Expected Inflation
Country Pre-I.T. Mean Post-I.T. Mean Test Statistic
Australia 1.91 0.63 11.15 (Reject)
Canada 0.52 0.14 16.26 (Reject)
New Zealand 3.18 0.63 6.09 (Reject)
Sweden 0.65 0.21 15.33 (Reject)
United Kingdom 0.65 0.18 14.98 (Reject)
Table 4: Non-Parametric Test Results For The Variance Of Expected Inflation
Country Pre-I.T. Variance Post-I.T. Variance Test Statistic
Australia 0.37 0.16 2.27 (Reject)
Canada 0.05 0.01 4.07 (Reject)
New Zealand 8.35 0.15 54.57 (Reject)
Sweden 0.02 0.09 3.70 (Reject)
United Kingdom 0.11 0.01 10.22 (Reject)
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Table 5: Non-Parametric Test Results For The Mean Of Structural Uncertainty
Country Pre-I.T. Mean Post-I.T. Mean Test Statistic
Australia 0.41 0.39 0.48 (Cannot Reject)
Canada 0.06 0.08 -1.75 (Cannot Reject)
New Zealand 1.99 0.33 5.44 (Reject)
Sweden 0.19 0.17 2.38 (Reject)
United Kingdom 0.18 0.15 3.96 (Reject)
Table 6: Non-Parametric Test Results For The Mean Of Impulse Uncertainty
Country Pre-I.T. Mean Post-I.T. Mean Test Statistic
Australia 0.33 0.30 0.98 (Cannot Reject)
Canada 0.044 0.052 -1.96 (Cannot Reject)
New Zealand 0.13 0.12 3.17 (Reject)
Sweden 0.17 0.15 4.85 (Reject)
United Kingdom 0.16 0.12 5.67 (Reject)
Table 3 clearly shows that the average expected inflation is significantly
lower after the implementation of inflation targeting for all of the countries. We
find similar results in Table 4 when we consider the test results for the variance
of expected inflation except Sweden, where, actually, the variance increased
sharply. Also, the case for New Zealand, the pioneer of the inflation targeting
regimes is interesting. While New Zealand has the smallest (though significant)
t-statistics when the mean of the expected inflation is considered, it has by far
the largest value when the variance of the expected inflation is taken. Therefore,
it can be stated that inflation targeting regime in New Zealand is eﬀective mostly
on reducing the variability of inflation expectations, while the opposite can be
claimed for the Swedish case.
Table 5 and 6 displays the results regarding the two derived inflation un-
certainty series, which are very similar. While we observe that both structural
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uncertainty and impulse uncertainty decrease significantly for New Zealand,
Sweden and the United Kingdom, we fail to find a statistically significant diﬀer-
ence for Australia and Canada. In fact, the uncertainty series seem to increase
slightly (though not statistically significant) for Canada after the adoption of
inflation targeting.
Consequently, the non-parametric results reveal that while inflation target-
ing regimes are promising in reducing expected inflation and its variability (if
we exclude the case of Sweden), the evidence is weaker when inflation uncer-
tainty measures are considered. The next step is to test whether the change
in the expected inflation and the uncertainty measures are strong enough such
that these series exhibit structural break after the implementation of inflation
targeting.
4.3 Structural Break Tests
To test whether there has been a shift in mean or a shift in the trend for expected
inflation and the two types of inflation uncertainties, the methodology proposed
in Banerjee et al (1992) is employed. There are two major advantages of the
test in our case. First, the break date is unknown a priori, and, therefore, the
date for the adoption of inflation target need not be imposed. Second, the test
searches for two types of breaks: “shift in trend” and “shift in mean”. Shift
in trend test provides information about whether there has been a change in
the slope of the trend. Shift in mean, on the other hand, provides information
about a jump or a break in the trend.
Finally, the test assumes that the series are constructed from a vector of
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regressors. Since the two types of inflation uncertainties and the expected infla-
tion are derived from such a process, the above-mentioned test can be employed
without any reservation.
The only disadvantage of the test is that it is designed for single break
points. In order to search for multiple breaks, one obvious method is to focus
on the range where you suspect that a structural break is present. This is the
methodology that will be followed here: we will search for a structural break in
a range of 10 years, which take the beginning of inflation targeting period as its
mid-point.
The structural break test results for a shift in trend can be seen in Table
7. It can be seen that there is no evidence of a trend break when two types of
inflation uncertainties are considered. This is not surprising for Australia and
Canada since the non-parametric test results for these two countries also failed
to find statistically significant diﬀerences in two sub-periods for both structural
uncertainty and impulse uncertainty. However, Table 7 further indicates that
inflation targeting does not lead to a change in the slope of the trend for two
types of inflation uncertainties when other countries are also considered. On the
other hand, the results are more promising in terms of expected inflation: we
detect a shift in the trend for Australia and Sweden right after the implementa-
tion of inflation targeting. Especially for Sweden, the shift in trend takes place
on February 1993, only one month after the oﬃcial announcement of inflation
targeting.
Table 8 presents the results for a shift in mean, which detects a jump or
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a break in the trend. It is expected that the results in Table 8 should not
contradict with the results gathered in the non-parametric test since both types
of tests investigate whether the diﬀerences in the average expected inflation and
the uncertainty measures are statistically significant. Similar to the findings
of Table 7, we do not observe a shift in mean when structural uncertainty is
considered. For impulse uncertainty, on the other hand, the shift in mean takes
place for New Zealand, Sweden and Australia. However, only for New Zealand,
the break occurs after the implementation of the inflation targeting. For Sweden
and Australia, the break takes place approximately three years before the oﬃcial
announcement. Therefore, combining the findings of both parametric and non-
parametric tests, there is only weak evidence that inflation targeting significantly
reduces any uncertainty regarding the inflation process.
Finally, and more importantly, the first column of Table 8 displays the shift in
mean results for expected inflation. The results strictly favor inflation targeting
regimes and they are consistent with the non-parametric results of Table 3. We
find that there is a structural break according to shift-in-mean test results for all
of the countries. Moreover, the break occurs right after these countries oﬃcially
announce inflation targeting4.
Consequently, it can be stated that inflation targeting regimes are particu-
larly successful in reducing average expected inflation. However, there is less
evidence about the positive impact of inflation targeting in reducing the uncer-
tainties regarding the inflation process.
4Especially for United Kingdom and New Zealand, the break occurs at October 1992, which
is the month of announcement of inflation targeting.
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Table 7: Shift in Trend Test Results
Country Expected Inflation Structural Unc. Impulse Unc.
Australia 1994:Q1 None None
Canada None None None
New Zealand None None None
Sweden 1993:M2 None None
United Kingdom None None None
Table 8: Shift in Mean Test Results
Country Expected Inflation Structural Unc. Impulse Unc.
Australia 1995:Q1 None 1990:Q3
Canada 1991:M8 None None
New Zealand 1990:Q1 None 1992:Q2
Sweden 1993:M5 None 1990:M1
United Kingdom 1992:M10 None None
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5 Inflation Targeting For Emerging Countries
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the beginning of 1990’s witnessed the
implementation of inflation targeting for industrialized countries. With the ex-
ception of Chile, which adopted the regime as early as 1990, most of the emerging
economies have shifted to inflation targeting in the second half of 1990’s, most
probably after observing the seemingly success of this new monetary regime in
industrialized economies.
However, the macroeconomic dynamics that determine the monetary poli-
cymaking process in these emerging economies are significantly diﬀerent than
the ones regarding the industrialized ones. Most of the emerging countries
have not satisfied the necessary conditions that are mentioned at Carare et al
(2002). Debt sustainability, exchange rate stability, a low inflationary environ-
ment along with deep and eﬃcient financial markets are crucial factors that
lead to a healthy and successful macroeconomic environment. Moreover, price
stability has been seen as the overriding goal of monetary policy. It is certain
that only a limited number of emerging countries seem to satisfy the above
mentioned criteria, which may cause serious distortions for price stability. As a
result, the success of inflation targeting regimes should be evaluated on diﬀerent
grounds for industrialized economies and emerging markets.
Next, it is important to make a further analysis of the factors that are seen
as pre-conditions to successful inflation targeting.
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5.1 Pre-Conditions of Inflation Targeting in EmergingMar-
kets
At Carare et al (2002), the following conditions are stressed as the pre-conditions
of inflation targeting:
1) Fiscal Discipline: In the economies where fiscal discipline is not satisfied,
the interest rates, which are the main policy instruments of the central banks
to achieve price stability can not be used eﬀectively. Just to give an example;
an increase in interest rates to reduce inflation will also incrase the debt burden
of the government, which may easily lead to capital outflows, depreciation of
the currency and increase in the cost of production. As a result, it is not a
low probability that a tight monetary policy to achieve price stability indeed
worsens price dynamics due to the lack of fiscal discipline and the debt stock.
2) Exchange Rate Stability: In the case of macroeconomic uncertainty, where
any internal or external imbalances can lead to a currency crisis, the central
banks should be in a position to intervene the foreign exchange and sustain
exchange rate stability. For that purpose, the foreign exchange reserves and the
credibility of the central banks should be well established.
3) Low Inflation: As it is made clear in the case for industrialized economies,
inflation targeting is mostly seen as the appropriate framework to serve as a
nominal anchor and sustain price stability. However, the application of inflation
targeting in emerging countries also includes a role for reducing inflation, for
which there are incerasing doubts. Therefore, it is necessary that the economy,
which adopted inflation targeting should conduct a price stabilization program
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before shifting to this new regime.
4) Deep and Eﬃcient Financial Markets: In case of any uncertainty that
may emerge during the shift to a new regime, the structure of the financial
markets gain utmost importance. If the financial markets are considered to be
shallow, then any speculative development has the potential to disrupt the well-
functioning of the financial markets and the overall economy. Given the fact
that most of the financial markets regarding the emerging countries had several
financial crisis in the past, inflation targeting should take the structure of the
financial markets into account.
Consequently, these four factors lead to the notion that the performance of
inflation targeting regimes may significantly be diﬀerent for industrialized and
emerging countries.
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6 Methodology for Emerging Countries
In this section, the impact of inflation targeting on expected inflation and in-
flation uncertainty will be analyzed for emerging countries. There is a major
diﬀerence in the methodology that is employed in this section: GARCH spec-
ification is found to be not suitable for emerging markets case. Therefore, a
time-varying parameter model without any conditional heteroscedasticity will
be employed for this purpose.
The sample consists of five emerging economies: Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico and South Africa. The adoption dates of inflation targeting for each
country can be seen in the following table.
Data Sample For Emerging Countries
Country Date Adopted Sample Period
Brazil July 1999 1980-2003, Quarterly
Chile September 1990 1980-2003, Monthly
Colombia September 1999 1980-2003, Quarterly
Mexico January 1999 1980-2003, Monthly
South Africa February 2000 1980-2003, Monthly
As Table 1 shows, except Chile, all of the countries in the sample shifted to
inflation targeting regime after the second half of the 1990’s. Since we fail to find
any GARCH specification, the results will reveal only two series: the expected
inflation and structural inflation uncertainty, which represents the randomness
in the time varying parameters, which, by the way, are assumed to follow random
walk.
The results of the time varying estimation can be seen in the following tables.
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Table 1: Non-Parametric Test Results For The Mean Of Expected Inflation
Country Pre-I.T. Mean Post-I.T. Mean Test Statistic
Brazil 0.52 0.71 -1.67 (Cannot Reject)
Chile 1.50 0.75 5.76 (Reject)
Colombia 1.09 0.71 0.31 (Cannot Reject)
Mexico 1.67 0.62 7.07 (Reject)
South Africa 0.62 0.58 0.87 (Cannot Reject)
Table 2: Non-Parametric Test Results For The Variance Of Expected Inflation
Country Pre-I.T. Variance Post-I.T. Variance Test Statistic
Brazil 0.20 0.33 1.62 (Cannot Reject)
Chile 0.52 0.61 1.16 (Cannot Reject)
Colombia 55.28 0.32 171.46 (Reject)
Mexico 0.78 0.16 4.85 (Reject)
South Africa 0.01 0.06 4.19 (Reject)
Table 3: Non-Parametric Test Results For The Mean Of Structural Uncertainty
Country Pre-I.T. Mean Post-I.T. Mean Test Statistic
Brazil 0.31 0.38 -1.82 (Cannot Reject)
Chile 0.80 0.39 5.02 (Reject)
Colombia 7.15 0.74 4.17 (Reject)
Mexico 0.67 0.31 4.44 (Reject)
South Africa 0.44 0.50 -6.00 (Reject)
Table 4: Shift in Trend Test Results (Emerging)
Country Expected Inflation Structural Unc.
Brazil 1997:M11* None
Chile 1990:M6 None
Colombia None None
Mexico None None
South Africa 2001:M10 None
Table 5: Shift in Mean Test Results (Emerging)
Country Expected Inflation Structural Unc.
Brazil 1996:M8 None
Chile 1989:M8 None
Colombia None None
Mexico None None
South Africa 2002:M2 None
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Consistent with several case studies, Chile seems to be the most success-
ful country to adopt inflation targeting. This is not surprising, given the fact
that Chile undertook a massive stabilization program to achive fiscal discipline
and attain debt sustainability. Also for Mexico, the mean of expected infla-
tion exhibits a statistically significant decrease after the implementation of the
regime. In case of structural uncertainty , the results for non-parametric tests
are promising again for Chile, Colombia and Mexico.
When the results regarding parametric tests are analyzed, Chile again emerges
as the country that exhibited a structural break both in the mean and the trend
for expected inflation. However, we failed to find any structural break for infla-
tion uncertainty.
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7 Results
In the 1990’s, many countries have adopted inflation targeting regimes as a
means to achive price stability and a nominal anchor. Other than viewing price
stability as the overriding goal of the monetary policy, increased communication
and accountability are the other important characteristics of these regimes. In
that sense, one positive result of inflation targeting regime emerges as elimi-
nating any uncertainties associated with inflation dynamics. Therefore, it is
thoguht that both expected inflation and inflation uncertainty would decrease
during the implementaion of an inflation targeting regime.
In this study, we tested the above mentioned hypothesis for two types of
economies: industrialized and emerging countries. To identify diﬀerent types
of inflation uncertainties and derive expected inflation series for thse countries
a time varying parameter framework has been employed. For industrialized
countries, since the model was suitable for GARCH specification a TVP model
with GARCH specification was used. For emerging markets, on the other hand,
a conditioanl heteroscedasticity has not been detected and therefore GARCH
has not been added to the model.
The results indicate that the inflation targeting is much more successful for
industrialized countries than it is in emerging markets. While observe a struc-
tual break at the time of inflation targeting for all of the industrialized countries,
we only observe such a break for Chile, which emerges as the most successful
inlation targeting economy when the sample is restricted to emerging markets.
Such a result is not surprising due to Chile’s massive stabilization attempts and
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fiscal discipline, which we do not observe for the remaining economies in the
emerging markets.
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8 Conclusion
In the beginning of 1990’s, motivated by the search for a nominal anchor, sev-
eral industrialized countries adopted inflation targeting regimes to achieve price
stability. Incerased communication and accountability, the two main charac-
teristics of these regimes are thought to eliminate any uncertainty regarding
the inflation process as well as to reduce expected inflation. Although the in-
flation performance of these countries improved, some recent studies criticized
the seemingly success of inflation targeting. Recently, in a panel data frame-
work, Johnson (2002) showed that there has been an improvement in average
expected inflation. However, his results also indicate that inflation variability
that is derived from surveys have not improved significantly.
In this study, instead of using the survey-based results, which may be biased
according to Bomberger (1996), we derive both expected inflation and two types
of inflation uncertainty -structural and impulse uncertainty- from a time-varying
parameter model with GARCH specification. The sample consists of five indus-
trialized countries, which have adopted inflation targeting at the beginning of
1990’s. Our methodology, which is previously employed in Evans (1991), allows
us to decompose two types of uncertainties, which provides an extra source of
information about the inflation process.
The results gathered from non-parametric tests show that the average ex-
pected inflation significantly decreases after the announcement of inflation tar-
geting. Except Canada, it is also found that there is an improvement in the
variance of expected inflation. The findings about inflation uncertainty series
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are less clear, however. While it is found that the two types of uncertainty series
significantly decreases for New Zealand, Sweden and United Kingdom, we do
not find the same evidence for Australia and Canada.
Next, the structural break test proposed by Banerjee et al (1992) is applied
to these three derived series. The test searches for both a shift in the trend and
a break in the mean. While we fail to find any shift in trend for the inflation
uncertainty series, we detect a shift for expected inflation only in Australia
and Sweden right after the announcement of inflation targeting regime. The
structural break test results of inflation uncertainty series for a break in mean
are slightly diﬀerent. We do not find any break in structural uncertainty for all
of the countries. On the other hand, a break for impulse uncertainty is detected
when Australia, Sweden and New Zealand are considered. However, only for
New Zealand, the break occurs after the implementation of inflation targeting.
Finally, the most promising results in favor of inflation targeting is obtained
when the structural break test is applied to detect a break in mean for expected
inflation. For all of the countries, we find a structural break in the expected
inflation due to the implementation of inflation targeting. For New Zealand and
United Kingdom, the break occurs right at the time of the adoption. For Canada
and Sweden, on the other hand, we detect a shift in mean within six months after
the implementation of the regime. Agents in the economy may have waited for
a short period to revise their expectations about inflation. Only for Australia,
the shift in mean takes place six quarters after the oﬃcial announcement. These
findings regarding the expected inflation are also consistent with the results of
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the non-parametric tests, which also find that the diﬀerences between expected
inflation for the two sub-periods are statistically significant.
Consequently, the results obtained in this study provide support for the
findings of Johnson (2002). The inflation targeting regimes are particularly
successful in reducing expected inflation. However, there is less evidence that
inflation uncertainty is significantly decreased with the adoption of inflation
targeting. As a final note, in all the cases considered, New Zealand, the pioneer
of inflation targeting, seems to be the most successful country.
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Figure 1: Structural Uncertainty of Brazil 
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Figure 2: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of Brazil 
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Figure 3: Structural Uncertainty of Chile 
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Figure 4: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of Chile 
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Figure 5: Structural Uncertainty of Colombia 
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Figure 6: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of Colombia 
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Figure 7: Structural Uncertainty of Mexico 
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Figure 8: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of Mexico 
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Figure 9: Structural Uncertainty of South Africa 
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Figure 10: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of South Africa 
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Figure 11: Structural Uncertainty and Impulse Uncertainty of Australia 
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Figure 12: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of Australia 
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Figure 13: Structural Uncertainty and Impulse Uncertainty of Canada 
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Figure 14: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of Canada 
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Figure 15: Structural Uncertainty and Impulse Uncertainty of New Zealand 
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Figure 16: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of New Zealand 
 50
Sweden
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
19
72
M
1
19
74
M
6
19
76
M
11
19
79
M
4
19
81
M
9
19
84
M
2
19
86
M
7
19
88
M
12
19
91
M
5
19
93
M
10
19
96
M
3
19
98
M
8
20
01
M
1
structural
uncertainty
impulse uncertainty
 
Figure 17: Structural Uncertainty and Impulse Uncertainty of Sweden 
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Figure 18: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of Sweden 
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Figure 19: Structural Uncertainty and Impulse Uncertainty of the United Kingdom 
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Figure 20: Expected Inflation and Real Inflation of the United Kingdom 
 
